Archive for July 12th, 2010
Lessons learnt from the Exxon Valdez
Reports suggest that BP may be close to stopping the flow of crude oil into the Gulf. With the flow abated one of the worst unknowns in this disaster, how long it’s going to go on for, will start to come into focus. This may serve as small consolation to the residents of the Gulf coasts many of whom felt unable to start picking up the pieces of their shattered way of life and economy until they knew what they had lost.
The battle between BP and the Macondo well has seen man pitted against the elements as scientists and engineers fought to overcome a force greater than their shared intellectual might. And if man has now vanquished the well congratulations and a huge feeling of relief will rightly follow.
But with the most dramatic thread of this disastrous story over, a few lessons need to be learnt from the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 to make sure that from here on the focus is on rebuilding communities and restoring the environment, and not on the legal strength of BP.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill was different from the events surrounding the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe on many fronts. The amount of oil spilling into Alaska’a Prince William Sound was from a finite source, and estimates quickly settled 11 million gallons as the total. In the first days after the spill, the cause seemed clear: a drunk Captain had absconded his duties and left an under qualified third mate in charge of an off course tanker that was traveling too fast. This lead to Captain Hazelwood becoming the most vilified man in the US and international media.
But after the first few weeks, when the cleanup effort had started, the flow of dramatic photos of oiled otters had ebbed and comparisons between Alaska’s bright blue-white glaciers and the dark invasion of crude oil in the Sound had been exhausted, the media started to slouch away. And with their focus gone, public pressure was diverted elsewhere and the most devastating damage to the communities of Prince William Sound and the people who came to help restore it was done.
The federal government was notable only in their silence over the Exxon Valdez disaster. And as the outside media turned away (local papers remained and were central in exposing the full implications of the disaster), the federal government was able to continue its line of disinterest.
The feds only reared their heads when it came time to divide up responsibility for overseeing a fund set up by Exxon to restore the natural environment at the instigation of a State of Alaska led court battle against the oil company. The federal government then demanded that a large proportion of the final settlement reached in 1991 to be administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for further environmental studies.
The State of Alaska victory against Exxon, was followed by a 19 year legal battle between Exxon, the State and the victims of the oil spill. The final settlement reached in 2008, after repeated appeals by Exxon, demanded $25 million from the oil giant that recorded $45.2 billion profits that year.
This drawn-out complex legal dance that Exxon choreographed was allowed by a lack of governmental strength, which was in turn permitted by a rapid decline in public pressure.
Fast forward 21 years and the Obama administration secured a $20 billion escrow fund from BP on June 16, 58 days after the blow out preventer failed on the Macondo well, putting them $20 billion ahead of their counterparts in 1989.
Obama has received no end of criticism for his handling of the disaster in the Gulf, but, as I’ve said in pervious posts, the current administration is in a very difficult position. Although concrete action is what the public might want to see, there is little Obama can deliver beyond rhetoric. The Escrow fund was a clear victory for the government and the victims of the disaster, but this was quickly overshadowed by niggling questions: Is it enough? Who will administer the fund? Will it be done fairly?
The Obama adminstration sought to answer all of these questions and concerns (which are absolutely valid). He put Kenneth Feinberg in charge, who handled post 9/11 compensation, and made it clear that the $20 billion amount, to be paid in $5 billion installments over the next four years, does not represent a final settlement. Obama also managed to demand the oil giant maintain the $20 billion in US assets to make sure that the money was readily available.
The root of the discounted over Obama’s handling of the Escrow fund episode may be the apparent ease with which he procured a deal from BP: it lacked the ‘ass kicking’ the president had repeatedly promised the public.
But ass kicking, despite it ability to sell papers and it appeal to public consciousness (I don’t think I’m alone in wanting to know exactly how Obama would kick someone’s ass- a slice to the side, a boot from the back or a high kick?), is not the most productive approach when trying to bring about a solution. The federal government, largely through the Coast Guard, has to forge a constructive relationship with BP.
The importance of pursuing a unified approach to the Gulf situation has frequently made it appear that the Coast Guard and the Federal government are limply following BP’s lead, as the same rhetoric appears in all of their statements. But rather than taking the cynical approach, how about viewing that as a positive: they’re talking to each other!
This was lacking in the response to the Exxon Valdez. Although the Coast Guard and Exxon repeatedly appeared as if they were cut from the same cloth, the coast guard was lacking the support of the federal government to actually put itself in a controlling position.
The web of failure that lead up to the Exxon Valdez is disturbingly similar to the failings that created the current disaster in the Gulf: a slow economy and lax regulation proceeded by eight years of a Republican government. But today’s government recognized the public relations nightmare that BP is trapped in and understood that now while public pressure is palpable is the best, if not the only, moment that they can demand that BP step up to the plate financially.
A change in the status quo that the oil industry enjoys can only come through tougher regulations, and the introduction of citizen oversight councils. The latter is happening, and the most successful oversight group in Alaska, Prince William Sound Regional Citizen’s Advisory Council (PWS-RCAC), which monitors the tanker terminal in Valdez, is in close talks with the Gulf states to set up similar groups. This is with the strong support of the White House.
If public pressure continues, and the Republicans don’t sweep the table at the Midterms, then a true and lasting change to the way the oil industry is allowed to operate in this country may be on the table.
Scientists today are hoping that the Macondo well is still under high enough pressure for them to put the containment cap in place. High pressure means the structure of the well is still sound, while low pressure would indicate that oil is leaking through many smaller gaps. High pressure is essential to see progress on all aspects of the Gulf disaster. It is only as pressure drops and time elapses from a disaster that monitoring slackens and corners are cut.
